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Abstract
This paper studies the joint dynamics of aggregate car sales, prices and income.
We analyze these series using a dynamic discrete choice model which is consistent with
microeconomic evidence on the infrequency of durable purchases. We estimate the
parameters of this choice problem at the household level. Through aggregation we
show that the model can reproduce the dynamics of demand captured by an ARMA
model, as in Mankiw (1982), and the joint dynamics summarized through a VAR
representation of car sales, income and prices. We ¯nd that most of the variation in
car sales is due to shocks which in°uence the replacement probability rather than the
cross sectional distribution of car vintages.
1 Introduction
This paper focuses on understanding the behavior of durable consumption expenditures.
Spending on durables is an important component of aggregate spending and one that °uc-
tuates considerably over the business cycle. At the household level, spending on durables,
such as cars, is lumpy: purchases are relatively infrequent and large. Modeling the time
series behavior of durable purchases, such as cars, in a framework consistent with household
evidence remains an open challenge.
¤Cooper is grateful to the NSF for ¯nancial support and to the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for
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to referees for helpful suggestions and comments and to seminar participants at Boston University, Boston
College, The University of Haifa, Tel Aviv University, Hebrew University, LSE, University College London,
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zUniversity of Texas at Austin.
1From the aggregate perspective, Mankiw (1982) presents evidence that the permanent
income hypothesis (PIH) model of durable expenditures is inconsistent with observed data.
In particular, he argues that in a single agent choice problem in which utility is a quadratic
function of the stock of durables, the optimal choice of the agent implies that expenditures
on durables will follow an ARMA(1,1) process, where the MA component is parameterized
by the rate of durable goods depreciation. Mankiw estimates an ARMA(1,1) time series
representation of quarterly durable goods expenditures for the US. In contrast to the predic-
tions of the theory, he ¯nds that durable goods expenditures follow an AR(1) process. Put
di®erently, Mankiw estimates the rate of depreciation of durable goods to be 100%. We call
this ¯nding the \Mankiw puzzle".
From the household's perspective, Lam (1991) reports that households only occasionally
adjust their stock of durables. Consistent with this ¯nding, Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1988,1992),
Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Caballero (1990,1993) view aggregate observations on
durable purchases as the outcome of the aggregation over heterogeneous microeconomic
agents. Taken together, these papers certainly suggest that a model of heterogeneity and
discrete adjustment can qualitatively match relevant parts of the data. 1
This paper studies the determinants of the time series representation of durable expen-
ditures in an explicit dynamic, discrete choice framework: can a dynamic discrete choice
representation of household durable purchases produce the observed time series behavior
of durable expenditures? We address this question by looking speci¯cally at two distinct
features of spending on an important component of consumer durables, aggregate car sales.
First, we con¯rm the ARMA(1,1) representations that underlie the \Mankiw puzzle" for our
various measures of automobile sales. Second, we estimate and study a VAR representation
of automobile sales, prices and income. Here we ¯nd that the impulse response function dis-
plays dampened oscillations in response to an innovation in income. So, besides confronting
the Mankiw puzzle for car sales, we ask whether an aggregated discrete choice model can
match and explain this rich time series response to an income shock.
This paper builds upon the framework of Adda and Cooper (2000a) who investigate the
1However, there is no characterization of the time series properties of durable purchases o®ered in these
papers and thus the \Mankiw puzzle" remains open. For example, the ¯nal section of Caballero (1993),
entitled \ARMA Representation and Impulse Responses" displays impulse response functions for Cars and
Furniture and states that \The shapes are broadly consistent with the description given in the paper."
Whether or not the estimated model can produce an ARMA representation close to that reported by Mankiw
is not speci¯cally addressed.
In a related, independent study, Attanasio (2000) estimates (S,s) rules for automobile purchases using
microeconomic data. After estimating the model, he undertakes an evaluation of the aggregate time series
implications of the model, as we do in this paper. He ¯nds that if there is more persistence in the shocks to
the target relative to the persistence in the shocks to the band, then the model is able to match observed
aggregate behavior.
2e®ects of scrapping subsidies on car purchases. An important di®erence between this paper
and the existing literature is that the empirical implications are drawn directly from the
dynamic optimization problem without imposing any structure directly on agents' decision
rules. In particular, while our model of durable replacement is of the optimal stopping
variety, we do not specify (S,s) bands directly nor do we ¯nd it necessary to specify a
\desired" stock of durables in our estimation. We do this for two reasons. First, we ¯nd
that empirically the PIH assumptions which underlies this \desired stock" approach are not
supported by the data.2 Second, deriving the optimal durable expenditure policy from a
dynamic optimization framework and then using this same structure for estimation is more
consistent theoretically.3
We ¯nd that the aggregate model based upon the dynamic optimization of heterogeneous
microeconomic units can \explain" both the AR and MA parts of Mankiw's regression results.
Further, a comparison of the impulse response functions generated by the models with that
obtained through an unrestricted VAR reveals why a PIH model has di±culty matching the
data. Suppose that there is an income shock. In the data, the initial burst of sales is followed
by a reduction in sales and then dampened oscillations (relative to the initial level). It is
precisely these endogenous °uctuations in sales that the estimated PIH model misses. It
is captured in our model by the interaction of a state dependent hazard function and the
evolution of the cross sectional distribution of car vintages.
We then use our structure to uncover the sources of these dynamics. In general, the
dynamic discrete choice structure generates variations in aggregate sales from two sources:
°uctuations in the replacement probability and the evolution of the cross sectional distribu-
tion of car vintages. We ¯nd that most of the variation in car sales is due to shocks which
in°uence the probability of replacement. Put di®erently, the endogenous evolution of the
cross sectional distribution contributes surprisingly little to the time series variation of car
sales.4
2In Adda-Cooper (2000b) we argue that the ¯nding, reported in Caballero (1990), that an ARMA(1,q)
representation of durable expenditures reconciles the evidence and the PIH model is not robust across samples
and the choice of q.
3These two points are, of course, related. Since we do not have convincing evidence that the PIH
prediction holds even in the \long-run", linking the estimation to a target seems unwarranted. Our approach
to estimation through a characterization of the complete household dynamic optimization overcomes this
problem as we do not require the speci¯cation of a target.
4This is similar to the ¯ndings reported in Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999) which studied the
implications of machine replacement for aggregate investment. This ¯nding is not inconsistent with the
emphasis placed on the movement of the cross sectional distribution in Adda and Cooper (2000a) since in
that exercise there was a policy action that had a signi¯cant e®ect on the cross sectional distribution of
vintages.
32 Evidence on Aggregate Car Purchases
This section presents evidence on the behavior of aggregate car purchases. We ¯rst show the
raw data on sales for the US and France and also the cross sectional distribution of cars by
age over the sample period.
We then extend the ARMA(1,1) representation stressed by Mankiw in three ways. First
our sample period is longer. Second we study both the US and France. Third, we focus on
both total durables and cars.
Finally, we present the impulse response functions (IRFs) from a VAR on car purchases,
income and prices. We use these IRFs to illustrate why the ARMA(1,1) representation
is inadequate. These IRFs are also used to evaluate the time series implications of our
estimated model.
2.1 Facts: Car Sales and the Cross Sectional Distribution
The time series data for car sales in the US and France are displayed in Figure 1. The data
are annual sales of new cars (measured as registrations of new cars) which is consistent with
the focus of the model on the extensive choice of either purchasing a new car or retaining an
existing one. As with other durable goods, these series display considerable volatility.
Figure 1: Sales of New Cars, France and US


































































































For our estimation, these data are supplemented by information on the cross sectional
distribution of car vintages, in Figure 2. These show the fraction of cars by age for each year
of the sample.5
5For the US data on the cross sectional distribution comes from issues of Ward's Automotive. For France,
this information comes from the CCFA. The French data stops in 1995 to exclude the scrapping subsidies







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































studied in Adda and Cooper (2000a).
5Using these CDFs, one can also visualize echo e®ects. Suppose that in some period, such
as 1989 in France, there is a burst of sales. In subsequent years, as this cars age, there is a
bulge in the CDF. Eventually, these cars reach the optimal (state dependent) scrapping age
and there is a new burst of sales. Of course, this process is tempered by the endogenous and
exogenous scrapping that occurs at earlier ages.
In our estimation, the CDFs come into the analysis in two ways. First, we match moments
from the CDF in the estimation of parameters. Second, variations in the CDF plan a role
in explaining time series variation in sales. Part of our analysis is to decompose sales into
variations induced by the CDF and those induced by variations in prices and income.
2.2 Time Series Representations
In this subsection, we explore the dynamics of car purchases in French and US data. We use
two tools. The ¯rst is an ARMA(1,1) representation which extends the analysis of Mankiw.
Second, we consider a VAR in sales, income and prices to broaden the characterization of
the data. After the estimation of the model, we revisit these characterizations of the time
series.
2.2.1 ARMA(1,1) Representation
Following Hall (1978), Mankiw (1982) extended the permanent income hypothesis model to
account for durability. In this model, the agent only consumes a durable good and faces an
uncertain income. If the utility function is quadratic, then expenditures on durables et by
the representative household follow:
et+1 = ±®0 + ®1et + "t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)"t: (1)
where ± is the depreciation rate of the stock of durables and "t is the innovation to income.
Using aggregate quarterly US data on durables, Mankiw (1982) shows that the series are
better described by an AR(1) process than an ARMA(1,1).
Working with annual series for France and the US, we report very similar results in
Table 1. The rows pertain to both aggregated durable expenditures and estimates based on
cars. For the latter, we have data on both total expenditures on cars (for France) and new
car registrations. The columns refer to estimates without removing a trend and then with
the removal of a linear trend.
For both countries, the estimated rate of depreciation is quite high. Clearly the hypothesis
that the rate of depreciation is close to 100% per year would not be rejected for most of the
speci¯cations. Further, the results are robust to the detrending method (we have also tried
exponential trends and obtained very similar results). For France, the data exhibit a trend so
6Table 1: ARMA(1,1) Estimates on US and French Data
Speci¯cation No trend Linear trend Removed
®1 ± ®1 ±
US durable expenditures 1.00(.03) 1.5 (.15) 0.76 (0.12) 1.42 (0.17)
US car registration 0.36(.29) 1.34 (.30) 0.33 (0.30) 1.35(0.31)
France durable expenditures 0.98 (0.04) 1.20 (0.2) 0.56 (0.24) 1.2 (0.36)
France car expenditures 0.97(0.06) 1.3 (0.2) 0.49 (0.28) 1.20 (0.32)
France car registrations 0.85 (0.13) 1.00 (0.26) 0.41 (0.4) 1.20 (0.41)
Notes: Annual data. For the US, source FRED database, 1959-1997. French data: source
INSEE, 1970-1997. US registration: 1968-1995.
we get di®erent values for the AR coe±cient.6 Thus Mankiw's \puzzle" seems to be robust
across categories of durables, countries, time periods and the method of detrending. That
is, under the null hypothesis of the PIH model, the estimated rate of depreciation is quite
high.7
2.2.2 Impulse Response Functions
A second and more general way of representing durable expenditures is through a VAR.
While focusing on ARMA representations, much of the literature on durable expenditures
has ignored the joint dynamics of durables, income and prices over time. Here we present
results using a VAR composed of automobile sales, automobile prices relative to the CPI
and income. While this representation has no structural interpretation, it provides a better
characterization of the dynamics of sales.
The impulse responses for new car registrations, prices and income, both for France and
the US are reported in Figure 3. The variables were ordered as income, prices and sales.
With this order, innovations to income are exogenous, prices respond to both price and
income innovations and sales respond to innovations in all three variables. This ordering
was imposed on actual data as well as the simulated data from the model, described later.
At this point, we do not provide a structural interpretation of these impulse responses. This
interpretation is provided below through our model of car purchases.
6Contrary to the argument in Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1988,1992), sales and expenditures have very similar
time series properties. This may re°ect the fact that variations in expenditures are largely a consequence of
the extensive margin (to buy a car or not) rather than the intensive margin (how much to spend on a given
car). Leahy and Zeira (2005) contains a model in which income variations alone lead solely to changes in
decisions on the extensive margin.
7Adda-Cooper (2000b) provided additional discussion of richer representations of the data. This included
the speci¯cation in Bernanke (1985) which includes convex adjustment costs for the stock of durables and
price variations as well as the speci¯cation in Caballero (1990) who considers an ARMA(1,q) models. We
focus on the ARMA(1,1) representation both because of its prominence in the literature and, as described
in Adda-Cooper (2000b), its robustness.
7The ¯rst two graphs displays the response of sales to an orthogonal income shock.8 In
both countries, after an initial increase, the sales are characterized by dampened oscillation
around the baseline. These oscillations could arise for two reasons. First, as emphasized
in the literature on non-convex adjustment costs with heterogenous agents, the endogenous
evolution of the stock of cars can potentially produce replacement cycles and thus oscillations
in sales.9 A second explanation is that income and prices are serially correlated and have
some cross dynamics. Indeed, from the impulse-response above, prices and income also
oscillate around the baseline following a shock on price or on income (¯gure not shown). We
return to an evaluation of the relative importance of these two sources of dynamics later.
The response of sales to price di®ers across the two countries. For the US, the price
innovation leads to a reduction in sales. The dynamic response through oscillations in sales
then appears. For France, the response to a price innovation is that sales increase. We return
to a discussion of this ¯nding below.
2.2.3 Can the ARMA model match the IRFs?
Figure 4 shows the response of sales from the estimated ARMA model for the US and
France.10 As shown in Figure 3, the actual impulse response functions from the estimated
VAR exhibit oscillations in sales following an income shock. The ARMA model is incapable
of matching this feature of the data. It is instructive to understand the di®erences in these
responses.
Using an ARMA(1,1), the impact of a shock on sales is ½t¡1(½ ¡ ®), t periods after the
shock, where ½ is the AR coe±cient and ® is the MA one. First, as ½ is positive in the
estimation, there is no way the ARMA(1,1) can reproduce the oscillations in the impulse
response function. Second, in order to match the patterns of response over time, (½ ¡ ®)
has to be positive. As ½ is estimated between 0.4 and 0.8 on aggregate data (see Table 1),
this means that the implied \depreciation rate" ± cannot be lower than 0.2 to 0.6. We see
here an important point about the ARMA(1,1) model: it is structurally unable to deliver
a \depreciation rate" low enough to be credible. We see this as the origin of the \Mankiw
puzzle".
8Error bands are included as well. The impulse response functions for France are tightly estimated. Those
for the US are not because parameters of the lagged price, sales, income are not very precisely estimated.
The series is shorter than for France.
9Discussions of these oscillations, in di®erent theoretical environments, appear in the Cooper, Haltiwanger
and Power (1999) study of investment dynamics and in the work on durables in Adda and Cooper (2000a)
and Leahy and Zeira (2005). Stacchetti and Stolyarov (2006) emphasize the role of product innovation.
10Here, as in the Mankiw (1982) model, the impulse in the ARMA is viewed as an income shock.
83 Dynamic Discrete Choice Model
Using these facts as motivation, we now turn to our model which we ultimately use to
understand these observations. The next subsection discusses the theoretical speci¯cation of
the discrete choice model at the household level. We then turn to aggregation of the model.
3.1 Household Behavior
The starting point for this analysis is a variant of the dynamic programming problem explored
in Adda and Cooper (2000a).11 Consider an agent with a car of age i = 0;1;::: in state (z;Z)
where z is a vector of household speci¯c taste shocks and Z ´ (p;Y;") is a vector of aggregate
state variables. As above, p is the relative price of the durable good, Y represents aggregate
income and " is an aggregate taste shock. Throughout, i = 1 denotes a new car and i = 0
refers to a household with no car.
In state (z;Z), the household decides whether to retain a car of age i or scrap it. If the
household decides to scrap the car, then it receives the scrap value of ¼ and has the option
to purchase a new car. The new car is available immediately. If the household retains the
car, then it receives the °ow of services from that car and cannot, by assumption, purchase
another car within the period. Thus the household is constrained to own at most a single
car. Each of these choices is in°uenced by a choice speci¯c realization of an iid shock zj for
the choices j = k;r.12 In addition, we allow for a constant utility gain, ®k, from the option
of keeping the car.
For tractability, we initially place a number of restrictions on this household optimization
problem. First, there is no second-hand market: cars are either kept or scrapped. Second,
the household is forced to ¯nance the durable purchase from current income: there is no
borrowing or lending in the model.13 This restrictions are imposed for purposes of tractability
and to focus on new car sales. We explore the implications of allowing used car trades and
savings in Section 6 on robustness.
Formally, let Vi(z;Z) represent the value of having a car of age i to a household in state
(z;Z). Further, let V k
i (z;Z) and V r
i (z;Z) represent the values from keeping and scrapping
an age i car in state (z;Z), respectively. Then,
11In this formulation, we have altered the form of the household speci¯c shock. It is now assumed to
represent choice speci¯c random component in utility with an extreme value distribution. As in Rust (1987),
this structure is quite useful for the solution and estimation of the dynamic discrete choice model.
12This shock has an extreme value distribution. Here j = k refers to \keep the car" and j = r refers to
\replace the car".
13In contrast, Leahy and Zeira (2005) allow for perfect capital markets but restrict the household to make
a single purchase over its lifetime.
9Vi(z;Z) = max[V
k
i (Z) + ®k + zk;V
















In the de¯nitions of V k
i (Z) and V r(Z) , the car is assumed to be destroyed (from accidents
and breakdowns) with probability ±.14 The cost of a new car in numeraire terms is p0 ¡ ¼,
which is stochastic since the price of a new car in the next period is random. The scrap
value of a car is independent of its age: the value of replacement is independent of i.









where c is the consumption of non-durable goods, ° is the curvature for the service °ow of car
ownership, ³ is the curvature for consumption and ¸ is a scale factor. In this speci¯cation,
the taste shock, ", in°uences the contemporaneous marginal rate of substitution between car
services and nondurables.15
In order for the agent's optimization problem to be solved, a stochastic process for income,
prices and the aggregate taste shocks must be speci¯ed. We assume that aggregate income,
prices and the unobserved preference shock follow a VAR(1) process given by16
Yt = ¹Y + ½Y Y Yt¡1 + ½Y ppt¡1 + uY t
pt = ¹p + ½pY Yt¡1 + ½pppt¡1 + upt
"t = ¹" + ½"YYt¡1 + ½"ppt¡1 + u"t:













As the aggregate taste shock is unobserved, we impose a block diagonal structure on the
VAR, which enables us to identify all the parameters involving prices and aggregate income
14The car wreck occurs, by assumption, at the end of the period so that the household receives the service
°ow of the car during the period, prior to the breakdown.
15This taste shock is included in the vector Z.
16We have only a single lag to economize on the state space of the agents' problem.
10in a simple ¯rst step regression. This considerably reduces the number of parameters to be
estimated in the structural model. We allow prices and income to depend on lagged income
and lagged prices.
The aggregate taste shock potentially depends on lagged prices and income. The coe±-
cients of this process along with !" are estimated within the structural model. By allowing
a positive correlation between the aggregate taste shock and lagged prices, given that prices
are serially correlated, we can reconcile the model with the fact that sales and prices are
positively correlated in the data. This allows us to better capture some additional dynam-
ics of sales and prices in the structural estimation. An alternative way would be to model
jointly the producer and consumer side of the economy, to get an upward sloping supply
curve. However, solving for the equilibrium is computationally very demanding.
The policy functions generated from this optimization problem are of an optimal stopping
variety. That is, given the state of the household, the car is scrapped and replaced i® the
car is older than a critical age. Letting hk(z;Z;µ) represent the probability an age k car
is scrapped, the policy functions imply that hk(z;Z;µ) = 0 if 1 · k < J(z;Z;µ) and
hk(z;Z;µ) = 1 otherwise. Here J(z;Z;µ) is the optimal scrapping age in state (z;Z) when
µ is the vector of parameters describing the economic environment.
The remaining part of the model is ¯rm behavior. As in Adda and Cooper (2000a), we
assume that the costs of production are independent of the level of production. Combined
with an assumption of constant mark-ups, this implies that the product price is independent
of the cross sectional distribution of car vintages.
This assumption of an exogenous price process greatly simpli¯es the empirical imple-
mentation of the model since we do not have to solve an equilibrium problem. In fact, we
have found that adding information on the moments of the cross sectional distribution of
car vintages has no explanatory power in forecasting car prices in the French case. Results
are mixed for the US case, as the average age of cars signi¯cantly predicts future prices.
Before proceeding further, note that the underlying model stresses the replacement of
older cars with new ones. Actual data presumably includes a component of car sales to
agents who do not scrap a car before buying a new one. Further, there are surely instances
where an agent scraps a car but does not buy another. Clearly movement of this type on
the \extensive margin" creates a variation in sales not included in our model. To deal with
this issue, we have detrended the data to remove the e®ects of population growth on sales.
Further, from our investigation of some additional panel data on French households, we ¯nd
that less than 2% of the sales are to households which have no cars.
113.2 Aggregate Implications
Aggregating over individual households (distinguished by z) leads to a prediction of the
aggregate demand for cars and a prediction of the cross section distribution of car vintages.17





where G(z) is the distribution of the household speci¯c shock.
Let f
¡
t (k) be the period t cross sectional distribution of k prior to any decisions by
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t (k) be the period t cross sectional distribution of k after the period t
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where µ is a vector of parameters. New car sales in period t come from two sources. The ¯rst
is the scrapping of cars by households in period t. The fraction of cars of age k is f
¡
t (k) and
the period t hazard is Hk(Zt. The second source is car wrecks. These wrecks are included
in f
¡
t (0) with H0(Zt;µ) = 1 as k = 0 indicates a household without a car.
The evolution of these cross sectional distributions are given by:
f
+
t (k) = [1 ¡ Hk(Zt;µ)]f
¡









t (1) = St; f
¡
t (0) = ±; f
¡
t (1) = 0:
These processes can be summarized as
f
+
t (k) = [1 ¡ Hk(Zt;µ)](1 ¡ ±)f
+









t¡1(k ¡ 1) + ± (7)
which conforms to (5).
From an initial condition on the cross sectional distribution, it is possible, using (7), to
generate a time series for the cross sectional distribution given a sequence of hazard functions.
17As we have assumed that z is iid, the distribution of this shock is independent of the distribution of car
ages.
12These hazard functions, in turn, depend on the parameters, µ, and the realizations of the
shocks. Thus given the parameters, an initial cross sectional distribution and a distribution
for the shocks to income, prices and tastes, we can simulate both sales and the time series
of cross sectional distributions.
4 Estimation
This section states our approach to estimation. We then present parameter estimates and
evaluate the results. Using the estimates, we return to the ARMA representation of the time
series.
4.1 Method
The parameters describing the joint process of aggregate income and prices are estimated
in a ¯rst step, to reduce the number of parameters in the structural estimation. The esti-
mation results for this ¯rst stage are displayed in Appendix A. The remaining parameters,
µ = f°;¸;»;¾y;®k;±;½"p;½"Y ;!"g; are estimated from the policy functions generated by the
solution of the households' optimization problem.
A natural estimation strategy is to ¯nd the parameters that bring data from the simulated
model as close as possible to the data. In our estimation, we make use of di®erent types
of observations. First, we use time series observations on sales, prices and income to match
the sales predicted by our model. Concentrating on sales exclusively does not identify the
parameters of the model such as the depreciation rate of car services, °. Sales are the
results of the interaction of a hazard function and the cross section distribution, both to
be estimated. If the shape of the cross section distribution is not pinned down, there are
several sets of parameters that would produce the same level of sales. Therefore, we also
match three moments characterizing the cross sectional distribution as well as three moments
characterizing the probability of scrapping a car, obtained from the yearly change in the cross-
sectional distribution of cars by vintage. The price, income and sales series were linearly
detrended prior to the structural estimation since the model itself has no trends.
Given a vector of parameters µ and a realized path of preference shocks ", the model
predicts aggregate sales and the evolution of the cross sectional distribution. These simulated
series can be compared to their empirical counterparts. The estimation strategy is to ¯nd µ
to minimize the \distance" between the actual and simulated data.
Formally, the criterion we minimized, via the simplex algorithm, was a weighted aver-
age of the di®erence between actual and predicted sales and between actual and simulated
moments characterizing the cross sectional distribution of car ages, weighted by their actual




where Á is a scale parameter de¯ned to be equal to the inverse of the variance of sales. The
minimization of the overall criterion yields a root-T consistent estimate for any ¯xed number
of simulations. We discuss the two components of this objective function in turn.


















The ¯rst term is the standard nonlinear least square criterion which measures the squared
distance between observed and average predicted values of the variables. For the sales series,
the estimation is conditional on the realization of aggregated income and prices at each date,
as well as on the initial cross sectional distribution. Given these realizations and the initial
condition, for each value of the parameters, we can see how close our simulated sales is to
observed sales.
Speci¯cally, let St be the observed aggregate sales for the year t. Let Stn(µ) = S(Yt;pt;"t;n;µ)
be the predicted sales for year t and for the draw n = f1;:::;Ng of the unobserved aggregate
shock, "t;n. The ¯rst component of the objective is essentially the squared distance between
St and an average measure (over the taste shocks) of ¹ St(µ) =
P
n Stn(µ)=N. However, such a
criterion produces an inconsistent estimator for a ¯xed number of simulations.
To overcome this problem, we follow La®ont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) by including
the second term which is a second order correction for the inconsistency bias introduced
by the random draws of the preference shocks. Under standard regularity conditions, the
asymptotic distribution of the estimators is normal and root-T consistent, for any ¯xed
number of simulations N, (see La®ont, Ossard and Vuong (1995)). In practice, we ¯x the
number of random draws to 50. We ¯nd that the correction for simulation error is then
negligible.
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i is a weight equal to the empirical inverse of the variance of each moment, j = F;H.
For these moments, the cross sectional distribution is referenced by F and the hazard function
by H.
The moments of the cross sectional distribution we match are the average (over the 1981-
95 sample for the US, over the 1972-94 sample period for France) fraction of cars of ages 5,
10 and 15. The idea is to use these critical ages to characterize the average cross sectional
14distribution. The predicted counterparts were obtained on simulated data from the model,
for a similar sample size.
Formally, let ¹ F i = (1=T)
P
t F i
t;i = 5;10;15 be the average fraction of cars of age 5, 10
or 15 during the sample period. Similarly let F i
t;n(µ);i = 5;10;15 be the predicted fraction
of cars of age 5, 10 or 15, in period t and given draw n of the unobserved taste shock. Let
¹ F i =
P
t;n F i
t;n(µ)=(TN);i = 5;10;15 be the average predicted fraction of cars of age 5, 10 or
15.
In addition, the moments include the average hazard rates at ages 5, 10 and 15. These
moments are de¯ned from the sample as ¹ Hi = (1=T)
P
t Hi
t;i = 5;10;15 where Hi
t is the
period t hazard for age i cars.
4.2 Estimation Results
Table 2 provides a summary of our estimated parameters for both countries.18 From this
table, the rate of depreciation of the service °ow is about 34 percent on an annual basis
for France and 41 percent for the US These parameters are precisely estimated and are
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. To get a sense of magnitude, at ° = 0:4, it takes about
¯ve years to lose 50% of the value of the car. Further, we ¯nd that there is some curvature
in the utility function for both countries, with a parameter around 1:7 ¡ 1:8, which is in
the usual range for curvature estimates from nondurable consumption using Euler equation
estimation.
Further evidence on the estimation model is provided in Table 3 which indicates the actual
and predicted moments. The model captures fairly well the cross sectional distribution of
car vintages.
For both France and the US, the probability of car breakdown is estimated at one to
two percent per year. This corresponds to the empirical hazard for very young cars. From
Table 3, the hazard rate is considerable higher for 5 and 10 year-old cars in both countries.
This is captured in the simulated data as well, re°ecting, inter alia, the estimated value of °.
The models are able to match rather closely the aggregate sales as the R2 vary from 0:72
to 0:93. By comparison, the R2 obtained from an OLS regression of sales on lag sales, prices
and income is 0:46 for France and 0:60 for the US.
When testing the over-identifying restrictions of the model, we reject them for both
France and the US. For France, the sales predictions are not as close to the actual data as in
the US. For the US, the model fails to match aspects of the CDF and the hazard functions,
particular the hazard for 15 year-old cars.
18The standard errors are in parentheses.
15Table 2: Estimated Parameters for Discrete Choice Model
Parameters Baseline
France US
° 0.34 (0.03) 0.41 (0.08)
± 0.02 (0.006) 0.01 (0.003)
³ 1.71 (0.01) 1.79 (0.05)
¸ 5732 (3e-6) 1.3e5 (1e-6)
¾" 0.10 (0.14) 0.006 (0.01)
½";p -5.7e-4 (4e-5) 1.1e-4 (4e-5)
½";Y 1.3e-4 (2e-5) 1.9e-5 (7e-6)
®K 2.6 (0.01) 2.06 (0.40)
½" 0.36 (0.06) 0.75 (0.03)
cor(Obs. Sales,Pred Sales) 0.72 0.93
P(over ident) 0.16 0.54
4.3 Time Series Representations
Using the estimated parameters, we can now explore the time series properties of the model.
As in the motivation, we focus ¯rst on the ARMA representation and then on the impulse
response functions.
4.3.1 ARMA Representation
Our interest is partly in the aggregate time series of new car sales produced by our estimated
model compared to those obtained from the data. ARMA(1,1) representations of the sales
series are reported in Table 3. The ARMA(1,1) results come from 100 simulations of 100
periods. The table reports the averages and the standard deviations of the coe±cients.
Our principle ¯nding is that our model is able to reproduce the abnormally high value
for the \rate of depreciation" inferred from the MA(1) coe±cient, when the estimation is
done through an ARMA(1,1) representation as in Mankiw (1982). To this extent, our model
is able to reconcile a low physical depreciation rate at the micro level (2%) with a coe±cient
close to one at the macro level, as viewed through the PIH model. The autoregressive
coe±cient is also estimated quite close to its value in the annual data once the time series is
detrended.
16Table 3: Observed and Predicted Moments from CDF
France
Parameters Observed Baseline
Fraction of cars less 5 0.48 (0.04) 0.57
Fraction of cars less 10 0.83 (0.03) 0.85
Fraction of cars less 15 0.96 (0.01) 0.96
Hazard rate at age 5 0.04 (0.04) 0.09
Hazard rate at age 10 0.17 (0.09) 0.17
Hazard rate at age 15 0.25 (0.16) 0.19
AR for Sales 0.26 (0.38) 0.28 (0.29)
MA for Sales 0.44 (0.57) 0.09 (0.34)
US
Parameters Observed Baseline
Fraction of cars less 5 0.36 (0.03) 0.40
Fraction of cars less 10 0.71 (0.03) 0.70
Fraction of cars less 15 0.91 (0.02) 0.88
Hazard rate at age 5 0.02 (0.01) 0.03
Hazard rate at age 10 0.11 (0.03) 0.08
Hazard rate at age 15 0.17 (0.03) 0.10
AR for Sales 0.68 (0.24) 0.56 (0.08)
MA for Sales 0.33 (0.30) 0.25 (0.12)
4.3.2 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 5 displays the results of one standard deviation shocks to income, sales and prices on
sales in the three panels, for both actual data and also from simulated data. All data are in
logs.19 The ¯rst row is the response of France automobile (log) sales to these shocks and the
response in the US.
For France, the model predicts a burst in sales following an income shock and then an
ultimate fall in sales by year 5. This prediction is also found in the actual data though the
oscillation in sales are more dampened. For the US, a similar pattern emerges with a fall in
sales in year 8 for both the observed and simulated data. The oscillations predicted by the
model are somewhat larger than those found in the data.
Figure 5, row 2 shows the impact of a shock of sales on sales. For both countries, the
model is able to track the response over time. Within our model, we interpret a shock on
19The impulse response functions from the simulated data come from the estimation of a VAR on simulated
data from the estimated model.
17sales as a shift in the aggregate taste shock, ", and its e®ect through time on sales.
The bottom row of the ¯gure shows predicted and actual responses to a price increase.
In the data from France, sales rise in response to a price increase while the model has the
opposite prediction. This re°ects the positive correlation between the innovations in prices
and sales. 20 Although the sales response to prices is negative in US data, this response is
much larger in the simulated data.
Overall, our model is able to reproduce a number of patterns pertaining to the dynamics
of sales. The next section investigates the sources of °uctuations in sales.
5 Decomposing the Results: What lies behind the Os-
cillations?
The estimated model has the ability to match an ARMA(1,1) time series representation of car
expenditures, as well as impulse response functions of sales. Given this \empirical success",
we now turn to a more intuitive discussion/evaluation of the model by looking further at
impulse response functions. Here we try to go inside the results to better understand the
source of the dynamics, particularly the oscillations in the impulse responses.
Caballero (1993) explains why a dynamic discrete choice model might explain the re-
sponse of durable expenditures to an income shock. The key point is that a shock to income
produces a dynamic in durable expenditures as agents respond di®erentially. While agents
may di®er along a number of dimensions, our analysis focuses on the cross sectional distrib-
ution of car vintages. Essentially agents with relatively old cars will respond to the income
shock by replacing their car ¯rst and then agents with younger cars will respond later. The
delayed response simply re°ects the upward sloping adjustment hazard: all else the same,
agents with younger cars are less likely to respond to income variations than are agents with
older cars. The evolution of the cross section distribution through time can be a source
of °uctuations, which are picked up by the impulse responses. As the distribution evolves,
following (6), sales will respond. In fact, the magnitude of this response depends on the
slope of the hazard function: the °atter is the hazard, the less responsive will sales be to the
evolution of the cross sectional distribution.
A second source of movement is the dynamics induced by prices and income as these
processes are serially correlated. Movements in these variables are represented by shifts in
the probability of adjustment (hazard).
20From the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals, the covariance of the log sales and log price innovation
is positive. Consequently, in the Cholesky decomposition: the response of log sales to a price innovation is
also positive. These features of the VAR representation underlie the reported impulse responses.
18We study the relative importance of these two in°uences (hazard and CDF shifts) in two
ways. First, we decompose the time series of sales into these two in°uences. Second, we
recompute the impulse response functions either by holding the CDF ¯xed or by limiting
the shifts in the hazard function.
5.1 Sales
For the time series of sales, using (5), the change in aggregate sales can be decomposed
into two terms. The ¯rst term is the change due to shifts in the hazard functions, such as
price or income movements against a ¯xed cross-section distribution. The second term is
the contribution of the shifts in the cross-section distribution, holding the hazard function
¯xed:
St ¡ St¡1 =
X
k
[Hk(zt;µ) ¡ Hk(zt¡1;µ)]ft¡1(k) +
X
k
Hk(zt;µ)[ft(k) ¡ ft¡1(k)] + ut (8)
For our simulated data, this decomposition is exact. The error term re°ects the fact that,
in the actual data, there are measurement problems and not all sales variations are a con-
sequence of replacement. Inspection of the time series of the error process indicates little
structure to this error supporting the view that it is mainly due to measurement problems.
Given data on the cross section distribution, we can compute the contributions to the
change in sales of the ¯xed hazard and ¯xed cross-section distribution components. The
¯xed CDF component tracks the change in sales very closely both for the US and for France,
whereas the other component has a much smaller variance and have a low correlation with
the change in sales. In particular, the R2 associated with shifts in hazards is equal to 0.93 for
the US and 0.75 for France and the one associated with shifts in the cross section distribution
is only 0.05 for the US and 0.23 for France. Thus in the actual data, hazard shifts are the
main source of °uctuations.
From the simulated data of our estimated model, we can also evaluate the contribution of
each term to the variability in aggregate sales. From a simulated sample of length 400, we ¯nd
very similar results to the real data: shifts in hazards are the most important determinant of
sales. The R2 associated with shifts in hazard is equal to 0.93 for France and the US, whereas
the R2 associated with shifts in the cross sectional distribution is only 0.01 for France and
0.02 for the US.
5.2 Decomposing the IRFs
Figure 6 shows the impulse response functions for the US and France from two simulation
exercises. In the ¯rst, we hold the CDF ¯xed and consider the e®ects of an innovation to
19income. In the second case, we allow the CDF to evolve but impose that the income variation
be temporary. Thus the hazard function shifts out for one period only.
We ¯nd that with a ¯xed CDF, the impulse response functions are close to the global
impulse response. Thus the dynamic is mainly due to the evolution of the prices and income.
The dynamics induced by the evolution of the cross section distribution contributes surpris-
ingly little. Evidently, the depreciation of cars along with the household speci¯c shocks are
signi¯cant enough to eliminate replacement cycles.
Narrowing down our search for an explanation of these oscillations, we simulate the
model with a ¯xed CDF, but we eliminate the cross e®ect of prices and income (we set
½Y p = ½pY = 0). Figure 7 displays the impulse response functions for the US.21 We then ¯nd
that all the oscillations are gone. From this we conclude that the oscillations in sales are
mainly due to the dynamics of prices and income, and more particularly to the cross e®ects.
6 Robustness
The results in the previous section have been obtained from a model which restricted the
trades of agents: (i) there was no market for the sale of used cars and (ii) agents were not
allowed to borrow and lend. We now study how our results depend on these restrictions.
We extend our model in those two directions and evaluate the robustness of the dynamics of
sales using both an ARMA(1,1) representation and impulse response functions from a linear
VAR model with sales, income and the relative price of cars.
We ¯rst start with a brief description of the extensions to the baseline model. A more
formal description of these extended models can be found in Appendix B.
6.1 Used Car Markets
Our ¯rst modi¯cation is to allow agents to sell their cars in a second-hand market.22 In
the baseline model, an agent receiving, say, an adverse income shock was unable to smooth
consumption by trading a relatively new car for an older one. This restriction reduces the
value of car ownership and in°uences the optimal scrapping decision for the individual.
In this section, we extend model (2) to include a resale option. Individuals have the
choice between keeping their car for one more period, purchasing a new car or purchasing a
21The French case, not shown, is similar.
22Rust (1985) uncovers the mapping between the solution of an optimal scrapping problem for a planner
and the equilibrium of a group of agents with a second hand market in an economy with no aggregate shocks.
From that perspective, the preferences estimated in the model without secondary markets are not those of
individual households but may be closer to the preferences of the planner. In our exercise, we add resale as
an option for private agents.
20second-hand car, while selling their own as a second-hand car. The price of a second hand
car is a decreasing function of vintage and varies with the price of new cars. We estimate the
parameters describing the price function from micro data. That is, the price for used cars is
not determined within the model. Rather, the price of used cars as a function of their age is
taken from the data and imposed on the individual choice problem. 23
The model is estimated as in Section 4 but we also impose that markets clear, i.e. that for
any vintage, demand is (approximately) equal to supply. This is done within the estimation
by adding market clearing as an additional moment. We also add as moments the probability
of keeping a car from one period to another and the probability of buying a new car (as
opposed to a second hand car).
6.2 Capital Markets
The absence of capital markets in model (2) implies that the cost of buying a durable good
cannot be spread over time, thus implicitly increasing the cost of such expenditures. With
complete contingent markets, this variation in marginal utility would be smoothed out over
time: consumption would be lower over all time periods due to car ownership but variations
in marginal utility would not only arise at the time of car purchase.
To evaluate the implications of capital market imperfection, we consider a variant of the
model in which there is borrowing and lending.24 To do so, we introduce wealth as a state
variable in (2) and thus allow borrowing and lending. We estimate the model as in section 4.
Given that we do not have data on the joint distribution of cars (by vintage) and household
savings over time, we initialize our simulations using the ergodic joint distribution of savings
and cars, obtained by prior simulations.
6.3 Robustness of Implied Dynamics of Car Sales
Details about the models described in sections 6.1 and 6.2, the estimation procedure and
estimation results can be found in Appendix B. In this section, we focus on the time series
implications for the sales of new cars from these two extended models.
The ¯rst results in section 4.3 was the ability of our baseline model (2) to replicate the
observed ARMA(1,1) pattern of aggregate sales. Table 4 displays the ARMA(1,1) implication
for the two extended models, for both countries. These results are obtained by simulating
the model over 30 years and estimating an ARMA(1,1) model. We used 100 replications to
get the standard errors. Each replication consists of a new set of draws for the taste shock ".
23We use the CEX for the US and the Enquete de Conjoncture for France.
24An earlier version of the paper also considered the case of linear utility. Our results on the ARMA
representation of the time series of car sales held there as well.
21Table 4: Robustness Check. Second Hand Market and Perfect Capital Markets
AR(1) MA(1)
Parameter Estimate st. err. Estimate st. err.
US Observed 0.68 (0.24) 0.33 (0.30)
US Second hand markets Model 0.59 (0.15) 0.32 (0.21)
US Capital markets Model 0.47 (0.17) 0.19 (0.28)
France Observed 0.26 (0.38) 0.44 (0.57)
France Second hand markets Model 0.68 (0.20) -0.14 (0.40)
France Capital markets Model 0.73 (0.15) 0.38 (0.43)
Note: Monte Carlo results obtained over 100 replications with sample length 30. French
estimates on annual car registration, 1972-1994. US estimates on annual car registrations
1981-1995. All ARMA models included a linear trend.
For the US, both models are able to replicate closely (in a statistical sense) both the
autoregressive and the moving average components. In particular, we cannot reject that the
MA coe±cient is zero, which would imply a 100% depreciation rate in the Mankiw (1982)
model. For France, both models predict an autoregressive components which is higher than
the one estimated on observed data. The moving average component is also lower than in
the actual data. This means that the \implied" depreciation rate is even closer to 100%.
We now turn to the impulse response functions obtained from a VAR(1) of sales, income
and prices as presented in section 4.3.2. We simulate each model over 30 years with 100
replications to obtain simulated series for sales, income and prices. We then compute the
(orthogonalized) IRFs by estimating a VAR(1). As previously, the ordering is: income,
prices and sales. The impulse response functions of sales to shocks to income, prices or sales
for all models are presented in Figure 8. In all cases and for both countries, the extended
models generate impulse response functions which are quite close to the one obtained for
the baseline model. For France, the IRFs are closer to the baseline one than for the US. In
particular, the response of sales from the model with second-hand markets is not particular
close to the baseline, even though the general shape is similar.
From these results, we conclude that the introduction of either capital markets or second
hand markets do not alter in any signi¯cant way the results for our baseline model in sec-
tion 4.2 in explaining the dynamics of aggregate sales. Clearly though, these extensions of
the baseline model have rich implications in other dimensions, such as savings or the type
of cars that individuals hold.
227 Conclusion
We have studied the aggregate time series implications of a model of consumption of both
durables and nondurables at the household level. Our model is a model of dynamic discrete
choice where agents make infrequent purchases of durables. We extend our model to incorpo-
rate second-hand markets and borrowing and savings. These models, once aggregated across
heterogenous households are able to reproduce some of the main features of the aggregate
data. In particular, our model matches up with impulse response functions from the data,
particularly the oscillations in car sales. We also have found that the estimated model goes
a considerable way towards solving the \durables puzzle" of Mankiw (1982). 25
Our approach to the problem follows a methodology that is quite di®erent from that
put forth by Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1988) and utilized in much of the subsequent work.
We speci¯cally avoid the speci¯cation of individual optimization in terms of (S,s) bands
and instead focus on the underlying parameters of the individual's dynamic discrete choice
problem. Further, our model was estimated using data which also emphasized properties
of the cross sectional distribution of car ages. Still, we ¯nd that this modeling approach
delivers time series implications that match certain features of the data.
In trying to understand our ¯nding, we are naturally led to a decomposition of the
movements in sales into two components: shifts in the hazard function and the evolution
of the cross sectional distribution. We report that most of the variation in the change in
sales can be attributed to shifts in the hazard function, though the evolution of the cross
sectional distribution is present to some extent. This contrasts with the conclusion inferred
in Caballero (1993), which stresses the importance of the evolution of the cross section
distribution of durables.
We show that our main conclusions are robust to two main assumptions we make in
solving our model: the absence of second hand markets and the absence of borrowing and
lending. Although these extended models are richer in many dimensions they have similar
explanatory power for the dynamics of car sales.
In terms of further work, there are two elements of our basic model that deserve addi-
tional attention. First, there are undoubtedly additional insights to be gained from allowing
endogenous price variations due to upward sloping supply to explain some of the results. The
assumption of exogenous prices dramatically simpli¯es our numerical analysis: the cross sec-
tional distribution of car vintages would be an element in households' state vector if prices
were determined endogenously.
Second, the models used in this study have implications at the household as well as
25To our knowledge, Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1988) deserve credit for drawing the attention of the profession
to this point. Our results show the link quantitatively.
23the aggregate level. We have not exploited the household implications of the model. Sup-
plementing the time series observations with household data on durable and non-durable
purchases provide a natural area for further empirical research.
24Appendix
A Estimation Results for joint Process of Income and
Prices
Table 5 displays the estimation results for the joint process of income and prices, used in the
structural model.
Table 5: VAR for prices and Income
US France
Parameter Estimate standard error Estimate standard error
½Y Y 0.75 0.12 0.67 0.12
½Y p 1.25 0.47 0.14 0.22
½pp 0.68 0.14 0.65 0.17
½pY -0.10 0.03 -0.04 0.09
!Y 3.0e6 - 2.6e6 -
!p 2.7e5 - 1.5e6 -
!Y p 2.6e5 - -1.6e5 -
Note: Regression done on detrended annual series.
B Extensions to Our Baseline Model
B.1 Used Car Markets
To include resale in our model, we study the following dynamic programming problem which
modi¯es (2) to include a resale option. As earlier, let Vi(z;Z) be the value of an age i car in
state (z;Z). This value is given by
Vi(z;Z) = max[V
k
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25In this case, replacement can either be through a new car, denoted V n
i (Z)+zn or the purchase
of a used car, denoted V u
i (Z) + ®U + zu. These options are de¯ned by
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In these expressions, the value of replacing a car may depend on its age through the resale
market. Accordingly, V r
0 (Z) refers to the value of replacement following a wreck with the
restriction that max(Áp0(Z);¼) = ¼.
Here there are three options: keep the car (V k), sell the car and purchase a new one
(V n) or sell the car and purchase a used car (V u). Associated with these three options are
individual speci¯c shocks, denoted (zk;zn;zu) which have an extreme value distribution.
In this speci¯cation, pj(Z) denotes the price of age j cars in state Z and Á parameterizes
the fraction of the car value recovered by the consumer. Since agent's have an option of
scrapping their cars, agents who sell their cars receive max(¼;Ápj(z)). Note that we have
introduced in model (9) a depreciation rate ±i which is a function of the vintage. Contrary to
our baseline model (2), new sales and scraps are disconnected as individuals who buy a new
car can resale the old one to another agent. Hence, to take into account the upward slopping
hazard of scrapping as cars age, we have to allow for a non constant rate of depreciation.
The introduction of a second-hand market introduces interesting complications into the
model associated with the determination of the price vector for used cars. Our approach is to
use the empirical price function estimated from French and US data. These state-contingent
price functions are taken as given by the households.
A concern with this approach is that it does not include a market clearing condition. That
is, there is no requirement that at the estimated parameters, the assumed prices actually
clear markets for all car vintages. We impose the market clearing condition by incorporating
as a moment that supply equals demand for each vintage at the observed price. Given
that we have more moments than parameters, we can only minimize the imbalance on the
second-hand market, so that market clearing holds approximately. In addition, as our model
is richer than the baseline model, we add two moments, the probability of keeping a car for
(at least) one year and the proportion of individuals who purchase a new car, conditional on
replacing a car. The observed moments are taken from the CEX for the US and the Enquete
de Conjoncture for France. 26
26The probability of keeping a car is estimated at 0.82 (France) and 0.87 (US) annually. The probability
26The estimation proceeds basically as described in section 4 with the added feature that
the price functions are estimated separately. From data obtained for both countries, we
estimate a price function pi(Z) = p0(Z)e¡¿i. For both countries, the price functions were
best described with ¿ = 0:2.
The results are presented in Table 6 under the columns \Second Hand Markets". Relative
to the baseline model, the estimated value of ° is much higher for both the France and the
US. The estimated value of ³ is slightly lower, at around 1.4. The fraction of the car value
recovered by the consumer, Á, is estimated at 0.95 for France and 0.84 for the US. This
parameter is di±cult to pin down as it represents a transaction cost over and above the
psychological cost ®U. The cost introduced from Á < 1 represent a vintage speci¯c cost as
it interacts with the price function.
This model ¯ts the US time series of sales better than the baseline speci¯cation and the
overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected for this country. For France, the ¯t is worse
than the baseline case in part due to the di±culty to match observed sales.
The row labeled \misallocation" measures the percent of market disequilibrium across
all the vintages. From these ¯gures we see that markets are quite close to clearing.
Table 6: Estimated Parameters for Discrete Choice Model, Model 2 & 3
Parameters Baseline Second Hand Markets Capital Markets
France US France US France US
° 0.34 (0.03) 0.41 (0.08) 0.54 (0.04) 0.36 (0.12) 0.42 (0.10) 0.52 (0.39)
± 0.02 (0.006) 0.01 (0.003) 0.09 (0.005) 0.01 (0.001) 0.08 (0.01) 0.006 (0.006)
³ 1.71 (0.01) 1.79 (0.05) 1.42 (0.01) 1.41 (0.04) 1.55 (0.08) 3.31 (0.22)
¸ 5732 (3e-6) 1.3e5 (1e-6) 4.3e5 (1e-8) 9.8e5 (2e-7) 1.4e6 ( 6e-6) 56868(1e-5)
¾" 0.10 (0.14) 0.006 (0.01) 0.006 (0.000 0.01 (0.05) 0.08 (0.02) 0.08 (0.05)
½";p -5.7e-4 (4e-5) 1.1e-4 (4e-5) -3e-4 (2e-5) 5.9e-5 (2e-5) -2.1e-4 (2.2e-05) 3.2e-5 (3.4e-5)
½";Y 1.3e-4 (2e-5) 1.9e-5 (7e-6) 1.3e-4 (1e-5) 2.2e-5 (5e-6) 3.1e-5 (8e-06) -3e-7 (9e-6)
®K 2.6 (0.01) 2.06 (0.40) 1.45 (0.05) 2.7 (0.07) 1.39 (0.47) 1.51 (3e-12)
®U - - -0.91 (0.01) -0.72 (0.04)
½" 0.36 (0.06) 0.75 (0.03) -0.37 (0.06) 0.90 (0.15) 0.04 (0.08) 0.32 (0.49)
¿ - - 0.2 0.2
Á - - 0.95 (0.05) 0.84 (0.17)
R2 for Sales 0.72 0.93 0.46 0.96 0.73 0.79
P overident. 0.16 0.54 0.65 0.02 0.21 0.19
% Mis-
allocated - - 0.16 0.08 - -
of buying a new car is respectively 0.48 for France and 0.45 for the US.
27B.2 Capital Markets
We extend model (2) to include savings. Denote by A the savings at the start of the period.
The choice of the agent is now:
Vi(Z;A;z) = max[V
k
i (Z;A) + zk;V
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where A0 is constrained to be positive. Here R is the assumed constant gross rate of return
and set at 1.05. With this modi¯cation of the dynamic programming problem, we can simu-
late the individual choices using the estimated parameters. The model implies a probability
of scrapping a car which depends on current income, prices, the taste shock and assets.
To simulate the sales of cars through time, we need to know the joint density of cars and
assets for the ¯rst period. Given that we do not have it from the data, we use the ergodic
distribution obtained through a simulation of the model for a large number of periods.
Our ¯ndings for this case are summarized in Table 6 under the column \Capital Markets".
The estimation of the utility depreciation of cars is roughly in of the same magnitude for
both countries, slightly lower for France and slightly higher for the US. The curvature of the
utility function is larger for both countries, especially for the US. Now that individuals have
can smooth their purchase over many periods, the estimation can pick a utility function with
more curvature. The ¯t of the model is worse for France and better for the US.
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30Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions






































































































































































1Figure 4: ARMA and IRF Comparison















32Figure 5: Impulse Response Function for Sales, Simulated and Actual Data
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33Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions: Decompositions



































































Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions: No Price Interactions




































34Figure 8: Impulse Response Function, All Models
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